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Democratic Dawn? Civil Society and
Elections in Myanmar 2010–2012 
Michael Lidauer 
Abstract: While the general elections in Myanmar in November 2010 were 
widely condemned, both national and international actors approached the 
by-elections of April 2012 as a political rite-de-passage to improve relations 
between the government and the opposition inside, and between the former 
pariah state and the international community outside the country. An under-
current of the government-led transition process from an authoritarian to a 
formally more democratic regime was the development of a politically ori-
ented civil society that found ways to engage in the electoral process. This 
article describes the emerging spaces of election-related civil society activism 
in the forms of civic and voter education, national election observation, and 
election-related agency in the media. Noting that, in particular, election ob-
servation helps connect civil society to regional and international debates, 
the paper draws preliminary conclusions about further developments ahead 
of the general elections in Myanmar expected to take place in 2015. 
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Introduction 
The general elections of 7 November 2010 were widely condemned as a 
sham and not in line with international standards, but during the first year 
after the polls, political observers inside and outside the country started to 
comment cautiously that change was coming to Myanmar.1 To the surprise 
of many, the new government under President Thein Sein launched an un-
precedented reform process. Among its most visible measures, it started to 
distance itself economically from China, acknowledged and subsequently 
released hundreds of political prisoners, established a human rights commis-
sion, renewed ceasefire negotiations with paramilitary ethnic groups, and 
took the first steps toward a reconciliation with opposition leader Aung San 
Suu Kyi and her political party, the National League for Democracy (NLD). 
A few legal changes created conditions under which “the Lady” and the 
NLD decided to take part in the by-elections on 1 April 2012, which they 
won by a landslide.  
In contrast to the general elections of 2010, the by-elections were ap-
plauded for their fairness and increased transparency, although the legal 
framework and the administrative procedures for polling had largely re-
mained the same. They mark another step in a government-led transition 
from an authoritarian regime2 toward a formally more democratic political 
system, albeit with a powerful military component, and an uncertain out-
come. Despite only a small number of legislative seats having been contest-
ed, they had great symbolic and widely visible value in paving the way for 
Aung San Suu Kyi’s return to politics. The by-elections can therefore be 
seen as a political rite-de-passage, in terms of both national reconciliation and 
the country’s international relations, opening up Myanmar to new political 
and economic exchanges after military hegemony, self-isolation and sanc-
tions (compare Bünte and Portela 2012).  
While the elections and the government’s reform intentions have re-
ceived much international attention, another development is taking place, 
one going largely unnoticed outside non-governmental organisations 
(NGOs) and donor communities: the development of a politically engaged 
civil society, including an active role of Myanmar’s press. The relationship 
between civil society and democracy is not inherent, but complex (Mercer 
1   In this article, “Burma” refers to times before 1989, and “Myanmar” for the period 
after; however, the original term is respected in quotations. The adjective “Burmese” 
is used to designate speakers of the Burmese language. 
2   For transitions to democracy, compare e.g. Merkel and Puhle (1999). For the con-
ceptualisation of Myanmar as an authoritarian regime, this article follows Lorch’s 
(2006) application of Linz’s (2000) typology.  Civil Society and Elections in Myanmar 2010–2012  89 
2002). Neither transparent elections nor the existence of a vibrant civil soci-
ety can make “democracy” on its own, but both are considered conditions 
of democratic consolidation (Linz and Stepan 1996; Merkel and Puhle 2000), 
which the government of Myanmar has sought to achieve since it an-
nounced its Roadmap to Democracy.3 
Civil society activities developed in Myanmar despite years of military 
rule, partly in response to the transition process led by the military elite, 
although this was a consequence probably unintended by the latter. In legal 
grey areas and often under the government’s radar screen, civil society activ-
ists have opened spaces of discourse and action that have the potential to 
support and influence, but also oppose, political reforms. This article de-
scribes the emerging politically engaged civil society in the context of the 
electoral process. First, it briefly reviews Myanmar’s Roadmap to Democra-
cy; second, it takes into account the development of an active civil society 
organisation (CSO) scene under the authoritarian regime. At its core, the 
article looks at election-related civil society engagement in three interlinked 
domains – the media, civic and voter education, and national election obser-
vation. Presented first is the media section, which delves into the conditions 
of freedom of expression and shows the dynamics of change between 2010 
and 2012. Before summarising its findings, the article draws preliminary 
conclusions, including on international linkages in the field of democracy 
promotion, with a view to the general elections expected for 2015. 
This research paper4 is based on 80 interviews conducted in Myanmar 
in November/December 2010, July/August 2011 and March/April 2012,5 
along with online research of election-related reports. Research conditions 
in Myanmar changed significantly during this period. In 2010, many poten-
tial interview partners felt it was too risky to talk about their activities; in 
2012, it was easier to enjoy mutual exchanges in an atmosphere of trust. 
Given the sensitivity of the matter, most names of organisations and inter-
view partners are kept anonymous, unless they explicitly consented to have 
their names published. The author does not claim to paint a fully compre-
hensive picture of all election-related civil society activities in Myanmar and 
3   Online: <www.ibiblio.org/obl/docs/KMWroadmap104.htm> (19 October 2011). 
4   The article has benefitted from the valuable comments of two anonymous review-
ers as well as remarks and notes by Rainer Einzenberger, Rhea Tamara Hoffmann, 
Emma Larkin, Sofia Massoud, Leandro Nagore, Gilles Saphy, colleagues at the 
Peace Research Institute Frankfurt (PRIF), and friends in Myanmar. However, all 
misrepresentations and shortcomings in the presentation of empirical data and their 
analysis lie with the author. 
5   All interviews in Myanmar were conducted in English. Hence, quotations in Eng-
lish are direct quotations from the interview partners and not subsequent transla-
tions.   90 Michael Lidauer 
acknowledges shortcomings, especially concerning the representation of the 
country’s ethnic heterogeneity and cross-border activities, as the research 
was mainly, but not exclusively, conducted in Yangon.6
The Way toward a “Discipline-flourishing, Genuine 
Multiparty Democracy” 
Discussions about democracy7 in Burma date back to the late colonial peri-
od (compare Blum et al. 2010), but much of the rhetoric around the recent 
electoral process stems from events in 1988 and 1990: In July 1988, after 
student uprisings and countrywide demonstrations, President Ne Win, who 
had been in power since the 1962 military coup, resigned. This was followed 
by a call for a national referendum on forming a multiparty system. Shortly 
after, the Tatmadaw (Myanmar’s armed forces) resumed power in the form 
of the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) and promised 
multiparty elections as soon as stability would be restored. The biggest 
emerging political party was the National League for Democracy (NLD), led 
by former military officers and politicians, and Aung San Suu Kyi, the 
daughter of national hero General Aung San, the architect of the country’s 
independence. Elections were not held until May 1990, when they culminat-
ed in an NLD victory. As announced shortly before the polls, the army 
decided not to hand over power until a new constitution was drawn up and 
a government formed (Tonkin 2007). 
The SLORC, later transformed into the State Peace and Development 
Council (SPDC), assigned a National Convention to draft the new constitu-
tion, which was soon dissolved and suspended for nearly a decade. The 
military regime used this time to consolidate its power (Bünte 2008). Politi-
cal dissidents were often arrested and an open opposition to military leader-
ship was not able to form. Voices from inside the country testify to an at-
mosphere of fear (e.g. Fink 2009; Skidmore 2004) during the SLORC/ 
SPDC regimes, while Western witnesses described an Orwellian control 
state (Larkin 2005). Political refugees established vocal diaspora networks to 
6  Myanmar is administratively divided into seven “divisions”, whose inhabitants 
largely speak Burmese, seven “ethnic states”, which each carry the name of a bigger 
ethnic minority (Chin, Kachin, Kayah, Kayin, Mon, Rakhine, Shan), and six self-
administered zones, plus the newly built capital of Nay Pyi Taw. The 1982 Citizen-
ship Law lists 135 ethnic groups. In this article, the term “ethnic states” reflects the 
lingua franca used in Yangon to speak of regions populated mainly by ethnic minori-
ties. 
7   For the citation in the headline, see Constitution of the Union of Myanmar 2008: 
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support the NLD and lobby for change from outside the country. Journal-
ists who had fled Myanmar founded exile media outlets that became instru-
mental in providing news and creating public opinion about the state.8 The 
international community wove a web of economic and political sanctions 
against the military regime that affected the civilian population.  
In 2004, the SLORC launched its so-called Roadmap to Democracy to 
reconvene the National Convention, draft a new constitution, hold a refer-
endum and general elections, and form a civilian government. The new draft 
foresaw the establishment of a bicameral legislative body, the Pyidaungsu 
Hluttaw, and 14 regional assemblies, ideally allowing for more direct ethnic 
representation in local politics. 25 per cent of each house was comprised of 
non-elected, directly appointed military members. The constitution appeared 
to establish a new governmental order by allowing military officers to be-
come civilian leaders and providing the old elite with a safe retreat from the 
political scene (Taylor 2009: 487–506). Despite another wave of public pro-
tests and arrests in 2007 (named the Saffron Revolution due to the presence 
of monks in marches) and the havoc caused by Cyclone Nargis, the referen-
dum took place in May 2008. The constitution was overwhelmingly accepted, 
while numerous reports spoke of governmental manipulation of the vote.  
Members of the political opposition – most of whom had not actively 
engaged in politics for 20 years – and civil society were split on whether to 
participate in or boycott the multiparty elections that were foreseen as the 
next step on the roadmap. Under the leadership of Aung San Suu Kyi, the 
NLD took a “no vote” position, while a splinter party, the National Demo-
cratic Force (NDF), stood for election along with several other parties, in-
cluding some based on ethnic identity. Moreover, certain CSOs accepted the 
new constitutional framework as a window of opportunity and decided to 
work with it (CS Monitor 2010). The groups opting for an engagement in 
the government-led transition, informally bringing together smaller opposi-
tion parties, CSOs, reform-minded members of the military elite, and a few 
individuals in the diaspora, formed a “third force”, which marked a depar-
ture from the long-standing polarisation between Aung San Suu Kyi and the 
NLD, perceived as pro-democracy, and the Tatmadaw, associated with dic-
tatorship (compare Zöllner 2012).  
The elections of 7 November 2010 and their legal framework,9 in par-
ticular the Political Parties Registration Law, were widely condemned inter-
8   Mizzima News in New Delhi and Chiang Mai, Irrawaddy in Chiang Mai, and the 
Democratic Voice of Burma (DVB) in Oslo. 
9   The Amyotha Hluttaw Election Law (SLORC Law No. 4/2010), the Pyithu Hlut-
taw Election Law (SLORC Law No. 3/2010), the Region and State Hluttaw Elec-
tion Law (SLORC Law No. 5/2010), the Union Election Commission Law  92 Michael Lidauer 
nationally because they did not allow a level playing field for political con-
testants. The common narrative among members of the political opposition 
today is that their votes were stolen by the fraudulent use of advanced bal-
lots10 and outright rigging. The governmental-proxy Union Solidarity and 
Development Party (USDP) won the majority of seats countrywide (883 of 
1,154), leaving only little parliamentary space for the other parties who de-
cided to compete. Ethnic-minority-based parties were able to gain more 
representation in the regional assemblies than on the national level.11  
Regardless of international condemnation and initial lack of trust in the 
transition process inside Myanmar, President Thein Sein started on a course 
of political and economic reforms (ICG 2011a, 2011b, 2012a, 2012b) that 
led to the participation of Aung San Suu Kyi and the NLD in the by-
elections on 1 April 2012. The by-elections were necessary to fill a small 
number of vacant seats in the legislature, following governmental appoint-
ments. They were held in 45 constituencies, but were cancelled in three 
constituencies in Kachin State where fights between the Tatmadaw and 
paramilitary forces are ongoing. 
The electoral management body appeared keen to administer a more 
open process in 2012 than in 2010, including a transparent consolidation of 
results. A regulated number of foreign journalists were accredited to cover 
election day. With regards to international election observers – their pres-
ence having been a demand of Aung San Suu Kyi in 2010 – the government 
followed a controversial policy by inviting some and expelling others.12 My-
anmar’s existing electoral system, first-past-the-post (FPTP),13 helped  to 
bring about an NLD landslide as much as it contributed to the overwhelm-
ing success of the USDP in 2010. Despite the NLD’s victory in all but one 
constituency it contested – the party also won all seats in the country’s capi-
tal, where the majority of voters are employed by the state – the entire op-
position is still only marginally represented in the Pyidaungsu Hluttaw. If it 
                                                                                                         
(SLORC Law No. 1/2010), and the Political Parties Registration Law (SLORC Law 
No. 2/2010), all adopted on 8 March 2010. The Political Parties Registration Law 
was amended on 4 November 2011. 
10   Electoral rules in Myanmar enable voters who cannot take part in the polls on 
election day to cast their ballots in advance. 
11   For detailed election results, see e.g. TNI/BCN 2010. 
12   ASEAN, the EU, the UN, the US, the resident diplomatic community, and coun-
tries from the region were invited to nominate observers. The Asian Network for 
Free Elections (ANFREL) was expelled for allegedly violating visa regulations 
(ANFREL 2012). 
13   Candidates run in single-member constituencies; the candidate elected is the one 
who obtains the largest number of votes. Therefore, the votes for defeated candi-
dates are not translated into seats.  Civil Society and Elections in Myanmar 2010–2012  93 
is supported by the 25 per cent of the Pyidaungsu Hluttaw comprised of 
members who were appointed from the armed forces, the USDP is in a 
position to reach the qualified majority required to change the constitution. 
The Emergence of Civil Society in Myanmar 
The “disciplined way” to political change orchestrated by the government 
was accompanied by an emerging civil society that found ways to engage in 
the electoral process. Before outlining these election-related activities, civil 
society in Myanmar has to be briefly conceptualised. In the following, civil 
society is referred to as different forms of civil activism between the family 
and the state (Hann 2011; compare Glasius, Lewis, and Seckinelgin 2004), 
including faith-based groups, but not private economy and political parties, 
although the line between opposition groups and civil society activism is 
often blurred. For the periods leading up to the general elections of 2010 
and the by-elections of 2012, this article speaks of formalised and emerging 
NGOs, journalists, and engaged individuals. 
British colonial rule allowed for the creation of independent Burmese 
organisations. Furthermore, an urban civil society, including a lively media 
scene, started to develop after national independence in 1948 (ICG 2001: 
3f.). However, it has long been the scholarly opinion that “civil society died 
under the Burma Socialist Programme Party (BSPP); perhaps, more accu-
rately, it was murdered” after General Ne Win seized power in 1962 (Stein-
berg 1999: 8). The constitution of 1974 effectively outlawed all political 
activity beyond the state’s strict control. Trade unions and most professional 
associations – for example, journalists’ groups – were forbidden. However, 
recent reports take a more differentiated look at civil society formation in 
Myanmar and argue for its historical depth, continuity, and social and organ-
isational variety (e.g. Desaine 2011; Kramer 2011). 
During the few months between Ne Win’s resignation and the installa-
tion of the SLORC in 1988, the country saw an unprecedented mushroom-
ing of civil society activities. Student-led pro-democracy protests were joined 
by people from all walks of life, and numerous independent newspapers, 
journals and magazines started to spring up (Kyaw Yin Hlaing 2004). On 18 
September 1988, the military culled these movements; several thousand 
people were killed before the end of the year. Political parties were allowed 
to endure in the run-up to the elections of 1990, but they were placed under 
severe restrictions in terms of disseminating information and assembling 
supporters (ICG 2001: 5). The SLORC developed a comprehensive set of 
laws that limited the freedoms of movement, association and expression 
(Liddell 1999).   94 Michael Lidauer 
Formalised civil society groups were for a long time practically non-
existent, with the exception of the Union Solidarity and Development Asso-
ciation (USDA) and other co-opted mass organisations founded and steered 
by the state. Steinberg (1999: 12) interpreted the USDA as the SLORC’s 
“own civil society” that was meant to carry the National Convention toward 
the new constitution. In March 2010, the USDA was transformed into the 
USDP – the main political party contesting the 2010 elections. Beyond state-
organised mass associations, civil society continued to exist in the form of 
faith-based groups (Steinberg 1999). During the BSPP, SLORC and SPDC 
regimes, religious bodies, with only few exceptions, were among the only 
permitted non-governmentally controlled social institutions. These encom-
passed Buddhist and Christian communities, as well as Muslim and Hindu 
groups (Kramer 2011: 30; compare Heidel 2006; Desaine 2011: 28–41).  
Examples of organisations that are not primarily faith-based are the 
Metta Development Foundation (since 1997) and the Shalom/Nyein Foun-
dation (since 2000), which were able to start localised development and 
peace-building activities. Their foundation is implicitly reflected in the works 
of South (2004, 2008) and Lorch (2006, 2007), both of whom noted – only a 
few years after Steinberg’s and Liddell’s observations – re-emerging forms 
of civil society activism in areas of limited statehood. South has drawn atten-
tion mainly to remote ethnic areas, ceasefire areas and war zones, and has 
emphasised the importance of civil society at the local level for democratisa-
tion from below (“bottom-up”). Opposing the dominant idea of change in 
Myanmar (that political reform ought to be elite-driven, hence “top-down” 
– either from the military regime or the opposition), he argues for the need 
for “two-way traffic”, whereby change must come from both the “top” and 
the “bottom”. He further emphasises that the Burmese government and the 
opposition, when cooperating toward political change and national reconcil-
iation, must not overlook the many ethnic conflicts and the issue of ethnic 
self-determination. 
Lorch, based on the observation that the authoritarian government 
“permits limited diversity regarding social practices” (Lorch 2006: 16), has 
shown that civil society under authoritarian rule developed in areas of state 
weakness to fill existing gaps in the welfare system. Like South, she ob-
served these developments at the local level, at the “grassroots” of society 
such as local self-help groups, informal development projects, culture and 
literature committees, in the sangha, and around Christian churches. Howev-
er, Lorch concluded:  
The observation that social spaces exist should therefore not be mis-
construed as ascribing any political negotiating power to the emerging 
CSOs which they do not have. Instead, they are issue-oriented and  Civil Society and Elections in Myanmar 2010–2012  95 
mostly very localised. In order to tackle the welfare needs of their re-
spective communities, CSOs in Myanmar are obliged to stay away 
from politics and are consequently far from performing an advocacy 
role, a task which is normally attributed to civil society in democratic 
contexts (Lorch 2006: 30f.). 
Civil society’s ability to communicate was transformed by changes in the 
surveillance of public spaces and increased access to technology: The dis-
mantling of the military intelligence in 2004 “left some space for NGOs to 
carry out their activities with looser monitoring” (Desaine 2011: 49); indi-
viduals felt safer discussing a wider range of topics in tea shops. Transferring 
the capital to Nay Pyi Taw in November 2005 reduced the military presence 
in the streets of Yangon. Tremendous developments in access to communi-
cation technologies such as mobile phones and the spread of the Internet 
increased information-sharing and networking (Desaine 2011: 49).  
The strongest impetus behind the development of civil society activism 
was the devastating effect of Cyclone Nargis in the lower parts of the coun-
try in May 2008. While the SPDC blocked access to international relief or-
ganisations for several weeks and censored news about the magnitude of the 
catastrophe, the immediate aftermath of the disaster saw the deployment of 
various ethnic- and faith-based NGOs from across the country to the af-
fected regions and the emergence of hundreds of new humanitarian NGOs 
supported by increased flows of foreign aid. For several activists, their re-
sponses had severe consequences. The comedian Zarganar, who headed a 
group of aid workers, was arrested along with several journalists who sup-
ported foreign media agencies, and there were many others (HRW 2010:  
51–56).  
The restrictions notwithstanding, many of the newly founded organisa-
tions stayed on the scene to develop new activities. Desaine’s (2011) obser-
vations show that younger NGOs are not necessarily based on religious 
foundations and develop at a distance from ceasefire groups. A report by 
Mahidol University (2012) emphasises the importance of “reading groups” 
for capacity-building initiatives. These groups, although widespread, do not 
attract much attention because of their small size. For those who do partici-
pate, these groups provide spaces for discussion and can initiate participants 
into civil society work, which leads to dissemination and recruitment. Even 
before the electoral periods of 2010 and 2012, members of reading groups 
read political theory and discussed approaches to the political stalemates.14 
14   Personal communication with a former member of reading groups on 15 August 
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The research presented in this article does not generate from ceasefire 
areas and war zones and goes beyond the scope of reading groups. It also 
goes beyond previous assessments by bringing civil society activities that 
explore political spaces, as such, to the fore. These activities are not exclu-
sive to areas of state weakness, although they inherently originate from such 
frailties (for instance, education) and respond to the actual needs of the state. 
I argue that while the government of Myanmar started a transition from 
authoritarian rule in a very controlled manner, the emergence of a politically 
active civil society was triggered by active engagement in the electoral pro-
cess and the constitutional debates preceding it. Civil society, in the form of 
NGOs, media initiatives and engaged individuals – apart from their capacity 
as voters – found two channels for this engagement: first, civic and voter 
education ahead of the elections, carried out partly with governmental con-
sent (compare Matelski 2012); second, election observation, initially con-
ducted secretly under the government’s radar screen, later becoming a half-
tolerated, to some extent publicly visible activity, allowing especially younger 
people to develop a sense of ownership and participation in the political 
process. Both activities increased the space for political discourse. 
Changing Spaces in the Media 
Before describing the emergence of election-related civil society activities per 
se, a closer look at the working conditions for journalists – who are here 
considered part of civil society – will allow for a better understanding of the 
restrictions to the freedom of expression during the late military regime, and 
the dynamics of the ongoing reforms. Apart from international media 
broadcasting in Burmese15 and exile media outlets operating underground, 
several journalists inside the country set out to report on the electoral pro-
cess under precarious conditions. In the words of a senior journalist and 
writer who spent several years as a political prisoner,  
Censorship has been a hallmark of Burma’s military dictatorship since 
1962. […] The job of a journalist in Burma is akin to shadowboxing, a 
constant effort to dodge the Censor Board without compromising 
one’s independence or the integrity of one’s message.  
In an essay entitled “Writing between the Lines: Practicing Journalism under 
Censorship in Burma”,16 he sought to explain the dynamics of the triad of 
15   The British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), Voice of America (VOA), Radio Free Asia 
(RFA) and the Democratic Voice of Burma (DVB). 
16   The essay was not published, but shared with the author; it is quoted as “Anony-
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the Press Scrutiny and Registration Division (PSRD), Burmese readers, and 
writers: 
All publications in Burma are required to submit their contents to the 
PSRD for approval before printing and distribution. [...] Blacklisted 
authors are banned outright from publishing. They should consider 
themselves lucky not to be in prison (Anonymous 2010: 5). 
The majority of Myanmar’s approximately 400 licensed regular publications 
are journals (weekly) and magazines (monthly), of which about 50 are dedi-
cated to news. The only daily newspaper is the New Light of Myanmar (in 
English)/ the Mirror (in Burmese), the governmental mouthpiece that is also 
used to report on election results. By not granting licences to other daily 
newspapers during the SLORC/SPDC regimes, the government maintained 
a monopoly on the daily news. During the 2010 campaign period, political 
parties had access to the media, but the freedom of the press was heavily 
restricted. No criticism of the USDP was allowed, and many articles were 
rejected.17  Reporting about the NLD and their “no vote” campaign was 
literally not possible. Journalists were allowed to meet the Union Election 
Commission (UEC) only once. On election day, the government arranged 
tours for the media, but they could not cover the elections freely. Journalists 
tried to speak to voters, but were not authorised to do so around polling 
stations.18 Despite the censorship regime, several private weeklies engaged in 
election reporting, published interviews with opposition candidates, and 
printed special editions. Unfortunately, some of these journals provided 
incorrect information as it was difficult for them to get direct access to the 
UEC, which used only the state media for dissemination (CPCS 2011: 57ff.).  
The media conditions began to change for the better in the immediate 
aftermath of the 2010 elections. Results per constituency started to be pub-
lished in the New Light of Myanmar, but any reporting on the elections other 
than in the governmental mouthpiece was soon overtaken by the news of 
the release of Aung San Suu Kyi from her third house arrest. One local 
reporter was convinced that “journalists were allowed to see the Lady to 
distract from candidates and the elections”.19  To their surprise, journals 
were allowed to publish articles about the release, although the contents and 
size of the reports were strictly regulated. Heavy punishments followed for 
those who did not follow the rules – all in all, nine papers were shut down 
within a week, something that had not occurred since 1990.20 
17   Interview on 20 November 2010. 
18   Interview on 20 November 2010. 
19   Interview on 23 November 2010. 
20   Interview on 23 November 2010.  98 Michael Lidauer 
By the time the by-elections occurred in April 2012, the media sector 
had moved to the forefront of reforms. On the first anniversary of his inau-
guration into office, President Thein Sein emphasised the “critical role to be 
played by the print media in the democratisation process” (Htun 2012: 2). 
The government started to relax submission to censorship scrutiny for a 
number of magazines in June 2011. In October, the head of the PSRD pub-
licly announced that press censorship “is not in harmony with democratic 
practices [and] should be abolished in the near future” (Larkin 2012). Inter-
net censorship was eased in March 2011, opening over 3,000 websites, and 
had been ceased entirely (with the exception of pages with pornographic 
content) by the end of 2011.21 Limited use of Facebook, blogs and other 
social media were already important in 2010, but these sites were used ex-
tensively in 2012.22 Portraits of the Lady started to appear regularly in the 
local press. Political articles still had to be submitted to the PSRD, but jour-
nalists did not feel any constraints in their coverage of the electoral process 
and could usually access polling sites. The UEC issued a timely invitation to 
a press conference, and reporters could address UEC staff at the state/ 
regional and township levels.  
In another unprecedented move, the government accredited foreign 
journalists in order that they could cover the elections, an encouraging move 
for the local press. There was still suspicion of the authorities, but less fear: 
“Our daily work has not changed, but we can write much more,” said one 
editor.23  However, the opening of the media scene also had unintended 
consequences: Based on the excitement around Aung San Suu Kyi’s candi-
dature, there was hardly any reporting on political parties other than the 
NLD. Smaller opposition parties, which had helped to open a multiparty 
discourse with their candidature in 2010, disappeared from the public view. 
This apparent NLD bias in the private print media anticipated the results of 
the by-elections.  
With regard to future developments, the regulatory framework for the 
media is in a dynamic process of change: Three journalistic associations 
were founded in March 2012 and new media laws are currently being draft-
ed. Private daily newspapers will be allowed to publish. After 50 years of 
pre-publishing censorship by the PSRD, this practice was abolished in Au-
gust 2012, and a Myanmar Core Press Council (MCPC) was founded. How-
ever, the restrictive Printers and Publishers Registration Act of 1962 is still 
in place. The current setup places more responsibility on the shoulders of 
editors and writers and evokes increased self-censorship. Sceptics see this 
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development with cautious realism and assume that many of the smaller 
papers, including weeklies, will not survive the pressure of the free market 
(e.g. Parker 2011; Htun 2012). 
Talking about the Constitution, Not a Revolution 
Editors and journalists, formal and informal NGOs, and engaged individuals 
started to conduct civic and voter education activities ahead of the 2010 
elections. Discussions about the new constitution served as a starting point 
for these activities, based on the assumption that not only was it better to 
know about the new framework rather than to condemn it without having 
read it, but also that an engagement in the government-led reform process 
was more beneficial for political change than were boycotts and sanctions. 
This approach stood in contrast to earlier attempts in Myanmar to achieve 
political change through revolutions in the form of public protests, like 
those in 1988 or in 2007. While in prison after his engagement for victims of 
Cyclone Nargis, Zarganar designed an “I vote” campaign, whose logo circu-
lated among civil society activists on stickers and T-shirts. He said, “I like to 
support the vote [...] if our people at least understand how to vote, this is a 
contribution to democracy.”24 
The New Light of Myanmar and to some extent Myanmar TV were im-
portant channels to educate citizens about the polls. It was acknowledged 
that the state newspaper called for participation in the elections, but did not 
publish USDP campaign material, nor did it show a political bias toward any 
particular party. However, the government’s voter education programme 
started only a few weeks before election day on 7 November 2010 and was 
insufficient, as many voters had no access to TV or to those newspapers 
that featured it. Independent and opposition-minded journalists also felt that 
they had to contribute to civic and voter education and provide information 
about the right to vote, although many did not expect that they would be 
able to publish anything along these lines.  
Even if they did not welcome the new constitution, a journalist ex-
plained that “inevitably we have to face the election [and have to] educate 
people to vote bravely and without fear”. He encouraged people: “Don’t 
fear to vote rightly [freely]!”25 A group of journalists thus decided to apply 
to start up a new journal that would address political issues. In May 2010, 
the censorship board allowed the foundation of a new journal entitled the 
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People’s Age.26 Aung Myint, one of its journalists, launched a project to cover 
the electoral process intensively even though he knew that not all the infor-
mation he obtained could be published. He liaised with other media outlets, 
deploying observers around the country to report on the election commis-
sion, the short campaign period, and other parts of the process. He admitted 
that observing the elections was hardly possible, and still suspects that the 
gravest undue influence happened in the counting centres at the district 
level.27  
Not only did the state’s voter education programme start late, it was al-
so provided only in Burmese and not in any other of the languages spoken 
in the country. Hence, the information offered by NGOs through informal 
channels in both urban centres and remote areas was very welcome.28 Ac-
cording to one NGO leader, up to 15 different CSOs in the country offered 
civic and voter education programmes. These activities rested on earlier 
capacity-building efforts (compare Lorch 2007: 71). Two international insti-
tutions in Yangon, the American Center and the British Council, have for 
several years been providing training courses for participants who are fluent 
in English (compare Mahidol University 2012). Their alumni often set up 
their own organisations, through reading groups, but there is also a growing 
number of local examples of training initiatives. 
“You need capacity-building before you can have democracy,” said Nay 
Win Maung, the secretary general of Myanmar Egress (quoted in Crispin 
2011), the most prominent organisation offering capacity-building and edu-
cational activities in Myanmar ahead of the 2010 elections. Myanmar Egress 
started to “explore the social space”29 in 2006, targeting freshly graduated 
students by offering curricula that national universities do not provide, such 
as “project cycle management”, “effective communication in business”, 
“strategic management”, and “social entrepreneurship and leadership”.30 
Myanmar Egress was the first such training institution in the country, open-
ing up terrain that was previously socially and educationally unknown. Its 
leadership, as well as some of the younger managerial staff, were educated 
overseas and decided to bring their expertise back home. International aca-
demics support the course curricula. When Cyclone Nargis hit the country, 
Myanmar Egress already had more than one thousand alumni, and half of 
them worked as volunteers with national and international humanitarian aid 
26   Interview on 5 August 2011. 
27   Interview on 30 July 2011. 
28   Interview on 29 July 2011. 
29   Interview on 22 July 2011. 
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organisations.31 In late 2009, a Myanmar Egress research team conducted 
opinion polls to understand the level of voter education and participation in 
the electoral process. That year, 11 workshops were held on different topics 
such as political parties, the legal framework, and polling procedures. Of the 
approximately 2,000 participants in these workshops, many shared the ac-
quired knowledge in their own networks, and some became political party 
advisors or offered campaign support.32  
Myanmar Egress is strongly supported by international donors; howev-
er, the organisation is the subject of controversy inside the country. Prior to 
its foundation, it was unprecedented that a CSO would actively collaborate 
with the military regime. The leaders of Myanmar Egress did, pragmatically, 
exactly that, and were thus shunned by those opposition political forces and 
CSOs that were strictly against any such collaboration. Myanmar Egress was 
proud of the fact that members of the USDP participated in their classes 
alongside other party representatives.33 Nonetheless, the organisation was 
accused of supporting, or actively engaging with, an opposition party, the 
NDF, during the period leading up to the elections of 2010. Accused of 
political bias and opportunism by different sides, Myanmar Egress had to 
perform a delicate balancing act between the government and the opposi-
tion, while staying on top of its day-to-day work.  
A familiarisation with the new constitutional framework was felt to be 
essential not only in Yangon, but also in the country’s “ethnic states”. An 
NGO dedicated to local development and peace-building started to “read 
the constitution from ethnic eyes” in 2009. One of the NGO’s leaders was 
convinced that “nobody is satisfied with the constitution, but we need to 
know it so we can amend it”.34 The new constitution was read and discussed 
throughout the organisation’s local network. After the laws regulating the 
elections entered into force in March 2010, the NGO organised a training of 
trainers to move their programme from civic to voter education – from a 
more general discussion of citizens’ rights and responsibilities, from voting 
rights to the technicalities of the ballot. The trained facilitators held “multi-
plication meetings” in their communities to familiarise voters with polling 
procedures, and with their right to choose, or to not choose, a candidate 
freely. 
Civic and voter education for the 2010 elections was limited to some 
governmental initiatives through state media, several private media outlets, 
and the aforementioned CSOs. Not all of them continued to conduct such 
31   Interview on 22 November 2010. 
32   Interview on 22 November 2010. 
33   Interview on 22 November 2010. 
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activities with the same vigour in 2012. A notable exception was the initia-
tive of lawyer Ko Ni, who wrote a civic education booklet based on his own 
analysis of the legal/electoral framework, published in the People’s Age under 
the title “How to avoid irregularities in voting”. Younger NGOs such as the 
Yangon School of Political Science (YSPS) and the Pandita Development 
Institute (PDI) joined the group of informal organisations offering civic 
education. However, the bulk of voter education and mobilisation for the 
2012 by-elections was carried out by a re-emerging political party, the NLD. 
The party appears to have mobilised a vast network of supporters in nearly 
all contested constituencies, informing their electorate about the polls. They 
also invited Ko Ni to tour the constituencies where by-elections were taking 
place. Despite all the public debates about the by-elections, a representative 
of another NGO active in civic and voter education explained that although 
the caution and discretion of earlier years was no longer necessary, they still 
focused on person-to-person contacts rather than dissemination by phone 
or mail “because many people were still not used to the changes in poli-
tics”.35   
Observing Elections in Transition from
Authoritarian Rule 
After civic and voter education, election observation became the major 
vehicle for civil society involvement in the electoral process. Recognising the 
existing risks and challenges, election observers in 2010 operated entirely 
under cover. Party representatives were allowed in polling stations and tabu-
lation centres, and, according to rule 66a of a UEC bylaw, ten witnesses 
from the group of voters (not further specified) were allowed to follow the 
count. There was, however, no legal provision for the accreditation of ob-
servers. Nevertheless, several attempts to witness the elections and to pro-
vide testimony were made, both in carefully planned and ad hoc manners. 
Despite some foreign influences, the impetus to monitor these elec-
tions and the perseverance demonstrated in performing this task resulted 
from the courage and vision of a few individuals. When asked about the 
beginnings of their activities, a young woman who had been involved since 
the early planning phase commented that it was “not a home-grown idea, 
but a home-grown commitment”.36 For many of the younger generation, 
this was their first exposure to political activism. Although examples from 
other countries were available, censorship rules and existing technology 
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made it difficult to access the relevant sources. At the same time, in their 
attempts to observe the electoral process of 2010, engaged organisations and 
individuals were implicitly building on many earlier examples from other 
“transitional democracies”, including in Southeast Asia – for example, the 
Philippines, Cambodia and Indonesia.  
A large Yangon-based NGO brought together approximately one thou-
sand observers, approximately half of whom became focal points for their 
own peer groups. As an organisation, they observed from the moment the 
election laws were published through the campaign period to the end of 
election day. To facilitate reporting, the organisation set up hotlines and 
asked for different kinds of “incident reports”. They operated an operation 
centre on election day, receiving reports by phone, or online via social media, 
and attempted to use Facebook to conduct a parallel vote tabulation. Re-
garding their relationship with authorities, the group noted that their work 
was usually possible in urban areas, but not in rural parts of the country.37 
The aforementioned organisation, which carried out civic and voter ed-
ucation in remote areas, also decided to observe the elections “to show how 
ethnic groups see this process”.38 Their report, later published by an interna-
tional NGO, lists a total of 803 observers who covered 758 polling stations 
in the seven “ethnic states” of Myanmar and in the region of Yangon (CPCS 
2011: 15).39 For those participating, election observation provided a neutral 
opportunity to become politically active without supporting the USDP and 
the new constitution, or the NLD and their boycott of the elections. The 
responsible decision-makers took a “calculated risk”, and chose the observ-
ers very carefully from within their own networks.40 In some instances, se-
lected observers were later recruited as lower-level election commission 
members or polling staff, providing additional insight into the process 
(CPCS 2011: 14). Most observers were very young, and undertook personal 
challenges to be engaged in this manner, such as not telling their families 
about their political interest and involvement.41 Due to the high level of 
secrecy that the organisers thought necessary, “it felt like a Cold War cell 
operation”.42 On election day, when two observers went together to a poll-
ing station, they had to hide their observation forms and take notes in se-
cluded places. Their consolidated findings were not shared with the wider 
37   Interview on 21 November 2010. 
38   Interview on 28 March 2012. 
39   This report is a valuable document for the period of the 2010 elections and is also 
used as a reference for this article. 
40   Interview on 29 July 2011. 
41   Interview on 29 July 2011. 
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public in the country, but were made available to a select group of foreign 
donors and embassies.43 Their preliminary assessment reached UN head-
quarters in New York the morning after election day.44 
Another attempt at national election observation in 2010 was initiated 
by a small group of young people around a former student leader who had 
been a political prisoner. After his second release from jail, he decided to get 
involved in the electoral process. He read the constitution, had the chance 
to participate in both a civic education training organised by a foreign cul-
tural institute in Yangon and further training in Thailand, and developed a 
voter education course book. Together with fellow teachers, he founded a 
group called the Citizenship Education Development Foundation (CEDF) 
“in order that all Burmese citizens know their rights and responsibilities”.45 
For the purpose of observing the elections in 2010, the CEDF was trans-
formed into MYNFREL, the Myanmar Network for Free Elections. This 
acronym follows the model of ANFREL, the Asian Network for Free Elec-
tions, and other domestic observer organisations in the region. 46 
MYNFREL did not reach the status of a formalised organisation, and no 
organisation carrying this name became a member of the regional network. 
The group merely used this name/acronym to create proximity and under-
standing for what they were trying to do. 
The members of this group did not have any formal training in election 
observation, but managed to obtain observation forms from outside the 
country, which they used to assess possible irregularities on election day. 
According to the team leader, they distributed up to three hundred forms 
per region, but many fewer were returned than expected. The network co-
ordinators had difficulties compiling the filled-in sheets; they were sketchy 
and provided no statistical evidence. At the same time, some members of 
this group followed up on electoral complaints with great commitment and 
perseverance. They acknowledged the enormous difficulties of operating in 
43   Interview on 29 July 2011. 
44   Interview on 28 March 2012. 
45   Online:  <http://baydaburma.wordpress.com/2011/06/11/bayda-institute/> (25 
October 2011). 
46   NAMFREL (the National Citizens’ Movement for Free Elections), founded in the 
Philippines in 1983, was the first national election observer movement worldwide; 
it contributed to the fall of President Marcos in 1986 and later became a model for 
election observers around the world. COMFREL (the Committee for Free and Fair 
Elections in Cambodia) is another such organisation. Together with PAFFREL 
(People’s Action for Free and Fair Elections) in Sri Lanka and around 20 other 
South and Southeast Asian CSOs, they are brought under one umbrella in 
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hiding, knew that they were “at the beginning” and needed more training, 
and could only practice through “learning by doing”.47 
Interestingly, the major organisations that had thoroughly prepared for 
election observation in 2010 did not intend to do so in 2012 (or decided late 
to run a limited exercise in particular “hot spots”). Less than a year before 
the by-elections, they did not consider these polls significant. However, new 
actors emerged who engaged in election observation without much prepara-
tion. Most of these initiatives were led by CSOs founded during the last few 
years of the authoritarian regime or since the inauguration of the new gov-
ernment. Their decision to try out election observation was borne out of 
their motivation to contribute to the ongoing political changes. They wanted 
to “do something” without always being clear about exactly what that some-
thing should be. Election observation provided an opportunity for event-
based political engagement upon which further activism could possibly de-
velop. For the new actors, the stimulus to observe was the participation of 
Aung San Suu Kyi and the NLD in the elections. At the same time, they 
acknowledged that – while non-partisanship was an important value in 2010 
– it was difficult to identify observers who did not admire the NLD. One of 
the leaders of the 88 Generation Students Group testifies to this widely 
shared sentiment: “Aung San Suu Kyi is not an ordinary person. Her voice is 
louder than that of other people.”48 
All in all, several reports were published – for example, by the Yangon 
School of Political Science (YSPS), the Pandita Development Institute 
(PDI), and the Myanmar Elections Network. The Myanmar Elections Net-
work, which brought together the 88 Generation Students Group with two 
younger NGOs, Generation Wave and the New Burma Network, comprised 
the largest group of election observers in 2012. The initiative for this collab-
oration came from a young woman who had already worked as an observer 
in 2010, but most other volunteers had no experience. The young activist 
approached the leaders of the 88 Generation Students Group after their 
release from prison in January 2012, which gave the movement a broader 
standing. The network established contact with a foreign observer organisa-
tion that offered to share some of its training materials with the group. Vot-
er education events and preparations for potential observers were held in 
many of the constituencies where by-elections were scheduled.49 
As opposed to 2010, the network also reached out to the media (e.g. Ir-
rawaddy, 23 March 2012), and their trainings became testing grounds for the 
new political space. One activist gave the example of a week-long training in 
47   Interview on 20 July 2011. 
48   Interview on 2 April 2012. 
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a rural constituency. Participants in the event included the local board of the 
UEC, who appreciated the input because they had hardly any formal training 
from within their hierarchy. The police arrived to question the convenors, 
but stayed outside the premises and did not intervene. As a safeguard, the 
organisers had informed the media about their plans beforehand.50 A mem-
ber of another new observer organisation told the story of an individual who 
tried to witness voting and counting in a military camp. He arrived there 
with the constitution and the electoral law under his arm, stating that ten 
voters from the public are allowed to witness the count – and was permitted 
to stay.51 The opportunity to conduct such activities quite openly, together 
with the unexpected freedom of movement for the press and the presence 
of some international observers on election day, contributed to a change in 
the atmosphere that was generally perceived as more open and transparent 
than one-and-a-half years earlier. Although monitoring in or around polling 
stations was still not formally permitted, the individuals involved felt less 
fear than before and felt that the space for civic action had widened. They 
wanted, in the words of an observer from YSPS, “[to] take their right as 
citizens”.52  
International Linkages and the Outlook for 2015 
An in-depth study of international support and exchange with CSOs on 
matters pertaining to the elections lies beyond the scope of this article, but 
initial insights have to be included in the analysis. Although the initiatives 
for election-related civil society activities were largely “home-grown”, inter-
national linkages do exist. Proponents of the “third force” were to some 
extent supported by international donors through discrete channels. As 
mentioned above, the British Council and the American Center are both 
active in Yangon and have allowed hundreds of civil society representatives 
an exposure to political thought and civic education. Based on reading 
groups, several alumni of these institutes founded their own organisations 
during the last few years of the SPDC regime or have done so since the 
inauguration of the new government. At the same time, local capacity-
building initiatives have emerged – most notably, but not exclusively, My-
anmar Egress – that provide a young generation of students with teachings 
in civic education and technical skills to organise their own activities. Their 
curricula are informed by the socialisation and educational experience of 
50   Interview on 2 April 2012. 
51   Interview on 9 April 2012. 
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course leaders during study periods overseas, or a myriad of informal ex-
changes with donors, international academics, and civil society proponents. 
As confirmed by the arrival of the Open Society Institute at the beginning of 
2012, it can be assumed that the capacity-building scene in Myanmar will 
expand, some existing organisations will further consolidate, and new organ-
isations will be founded. All these efforts combined are likely to enlarge civil 
society-driven civic and voter education initiatives before the general elec-
tions of 2015. 
Similarly, those agencies involved in election observation received in-
formal advice on how to approach their activities from “friends overseas”53 
in 2010 and 2012. Despite long-standing difficulties with computer accessi-
bility and Internet censorship, reports and guidelines from different interna-
tional observer organisations were circulating among election observers in 
Yangon. Although maintaining great levels of secrecy, members of CSOs 
participated in workshops organised in Bangkok,54 and several journalists 
enjoyed training opportunities abroad. Informal delegations from Myanmar 
have also observed elections in other Southeast Asian countries over the last 
few years.55 Some activists participated in ANFREL observation missions, 
and a few national election observation organisers were trained by ANFREL, 
COMFREL, and the EU’s Network for Enhanced Electoral and Democrat-
ic Support (NEEDS) (CPCS 2011: 12). One particular thread of internation-
al exchange leads to Phnom Penh:  
The Preparing Myanmar Civil Society for Elections project aimed to 
raise the commitment and capacity of Myanmar civil society to engage 
[in] the electoral and democratic process. It brought a total of 51 key 
members of civil society [, including] potential candidates in the 
planned election, to Cambodia to learn about Cambodia’s experience 
with elections. Eight different NGOs sent staff to attend the training, 
which took place in four phases over a three-month period in early 
2010 (CPCS 2010: 7) . 
In exchange, Cambodian experts in election observation came to visit CSOs 
in Yangon.  
In 2010, “most international donors refused to fund projects that they 
saw as supporting the elections, as they deemed the process illegitimate or 
questionable once the election laws had been released” (CPCS 2011: 47). 
After the by-elections in 2012 and the changes in the sanctions regime, do-
nors and intermediary agencies plan to gain local partners, fund support 
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mechanisms for elected parliamentarians, offer help to review the electoral 
framework and provide other technical assistance.56 They are also expected 
to support civil society at large. Most of the actors involved in 2010 and 
2012 were committed to conducting election observation again in the future. 
International organisations active in democracy promotion will seek to sup-
port them as one of several programmatic tracks.  
It has been argued that by promoting and safeguarding international 
commitments, international election observation has become a norm itself 
(e.g. Carothers 2010; Hyde 2011; Kelley 2008). National election observation 
could see similar developments. The ASEAN community, of which Myan-
mar will serve as chair in 2014, sees increased discussions about election 
observation (Alpern 2012), something that could be connected to develop-
ments in Myanmar. In the global arena, the recent Declaration of Global 
Principles for Non-Partisan Election Observation and Monitoring by Citi-
zen Organisations (GNDEM 2012) provides a new framework upon which 
local organisations will be able to call. Based on their own initiatives, and 
with the expected support of international donors, observer organisations in 
Myanmar thus have the opportunity to link to normative discourses about 
electoral standards and good practices of election observation, not only in 
Southeast Asia but also internationally.  
These regional and international points of reference might assist CSOs 
in Myanmar not only in broadening the discursive space on elections and 
democracy, but also in further institutionalising national election observation 
with the goal of creating legal provisions for observers to get formally ac-
credited by the UEC, to deploy in larger numbers, and to provide more 
consolidated non-partisan public opinion about the next electoral process. If 
the government of Myanmar were to create provisions for the accreditation 
of observers in the electoral law, this would not only be another step toward 
international standards, but it would also underline the country’s intentions 
to further democratise. This enlarged space for election observers might 
have repercussions for other fields of CSO activism in the political realm 
and increase the potential of civil society to host broader and more publicly 
visible educational activities and discussions. Holding that not all, but many 
electoral reforms require changes to the constitution for which a qualified 
majority of 75 per cent of Pyidaungsu Hluttaw members – possibly to be 
followed by another referendum – is needed,57 informed CSOs could con-
tribute to public debates about these reforms, including on the electoral 
56    For example, the European Union, the International Foundation for Electoral 
Systems (IFES), the National Democratic Institute (NDI), The Asia Foundation, 
International IDEA, and the Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU). 
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system. Such debates have already started; some political forces have argued 
for a change to the existing first-past-the-post system toward a sort of pro-
portional representation (PR) or mixed system.58 This debate is politically 
highly sensitive; its outcome has the potential to shape the formation of the 
next government after the incumbent. It will not be decided by CSOs, but 
CSOs might have the strength to disseminate the discussion.  
These developments provide vast opportunities for the many emerging 
politically engaged civil society initiatives in Myanmar. At the same time, 
many of them have not had much international exposure to date, and the 
NGOs with the experience and capacity to administer foreign funds, which 
are expected to increase tremendously, are but a few. Civil society is in itself 
fragmented, and, like political parties and religious organisations in Myanmar, 
often quite hierarchically organised. Many of the younger generation are 
looking for opportunities, but are still not sure in which direction to go – 
civil society work or political party activism? – because the boundaries be-
tween them are essentially blurred. In a very dynamic environment, some 
will seek to enhance their capacities in formal or informal NGOs, some will 
be recruited by arriving international agencies, while others will join the 
NLD or other political parties.59 Donor organisations have to be reminded 
to act with great care and to “do no harm”: to not overwhelm local CSOs, 
to avoid monopolisation, and to give a chance to younger organisations.  
Conclusion 
During the last few years of the authoritarian regime in Myanmar, civil so-
ciety actors, be they journalists or members of formal or informal organisa-
tions, have found new ways to get politically engaged. The indirect, although 
probably unintended, impulse for these changes came from the authoritarian 
government itself, which declared a Roadmap to Democracy and called for 
public support for a constitutional referendum and for voters to participate 
in the general elections and by-elections. The electoral process and constitu-
tional debates preceding it helped trigger civil society activism. By fulfilling a 
governmental need in educating voters about the new constitution and the 
technicalities of the ballot, CSOs increased their room to manoeuvre. Build-
ing upon these experiences, several organisations started to observe the 
elections of 2010, undercover, providing an opportunity for a younger gen-
eration to become politically engaged. In 2012, the government’s interest in 
a more transparent process changed the conditions for national election 
58   See e.g. the Myanmar Times, 32, 633, 1–3. 
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observation – while the latter was not formally allowed, it was tolerated. The 
legal framework for elections remained largely the same, but was altered to 
allow Aung San Suu Kyi and the NLD to take part. Support for the NLD 
and its leaders, although still marginally represented in the legislature, be-
came patent not only in election results, but also in the one-sided press cov-
erage in a newly opening media environment. It was also manifested in the 
biases of some election observers who came from a CSO background in 
which activists had hitherto little opportunity to distinguish between democ-
racy activism and activism for the NLD. The latter might change now that 
the NLD has re-entered the political arena and will have to prove itself as a 
political party among peers.  
During the by-elections of 2012, the government permitted national 
and international media to cover the process and gave journalists access to 
the state/regional election commission boards. Furthermore, the govern-
ment did not act against emerging national election observers and invited, 
although too late to witness the entire process, a few international election 
observers. All these factors combined, together with voters approaching the 
polls with less fear and more hope – instilled by the ongoing reforms and 
increasing trust in the new government under President Thein Sein – 
showed the by-elections in a new light of openness and transparency. De-
spite only a small number of seats in the legislature having been at stake, the 
symbolic power of allowing the major opposition party and its iconic leader 
to stand (and win) transformed the by-elections into a political rite-de-passage 
that, as a turning point in an ongoing reform and transition process, con-
vinced the international community to suspend or significantly ease their 
sanctions regime. 
After the by-elections, all eyes are now turned toward 2015, when polit-
ical parties in Myanmar will again compete for seats in the Hluttaws. It can 
be anticipated that CSOs will multiply their efforts in civic and voter educa-
tion and will observe the next general elections based on their previous 
experiences, but on a much broader and more visible scale, supported by 
international organisations and with references to emerging regional and 
international norms. The political space gained through election-related 
activities might further increase CSO activism in other fields pertaining to 
the ongoing reforms – for example, in relation to new peace-building pro-
cesses including interreligious dialogue, of which the country is in dire need. 
Civil society engagement alone does not make elections more democratic, 
nor can it bring about democratisation by itself, but it is a crucial piece of 
the puzzle that allows for the socialisation of a younger generation in politi-
cal awareness and can support a future democratisation process with en-
larged public debates and participation if the political arena permits it. It is  Civil Society and Elections in Myanmar 2010–2012  111 
safe to argue that civil society’s engagement in the process, rather than its 
boycott, has gained it a growing space in the political discourse. This space 
will continue to be negotiated over the coming years. 
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